Horumar

Written by Suldan Mohamed

Back in 1953, Somalia then known as the UN Trusteeship of Somaliland was a land split by politics. Somalis, still fresh from the return of their former colonial ruler Italy as the UN’s “Administrative Authority” were grappling with new divisions and an uncertain path ahead. It had been just three years since the Italian administration returned and tensions were running high between the nationalist Somali Youth League (SYL), known in Italian as Lega dei Giovani Somali or simply the Lega, and the Conferenza Somala (Somali Conference), a loose coalition of Somali parties backed by Rome that favoured continued Italian control. The political struggles of that era feel strikingly familiar today, with parties aligning themselves with foreign powers to exert influence. Athough back then the Somali nationalist movement stood on far stronger ground compared to today.

Brief Look: Tensions between the Somali Youth League and Conferenza Somala

In this section, I will briefly cover the history leading up to the tensions in 1953. I will discuss this period of history in a separate piece to save time.

During World War II, Somali territories were deeply affected by regional conflicts. In 1935, the Italian regime invaded Ethiopia from both Italian Somaliland and Italian Eritrea, advancing along two fronts. By August 1940, the Italians captured British Somaliland and parts of French Somaliland. This would unify the Somali territories for the first time. By 1941, British forces had defeated Italy across British, Italian, French, and western Somali territories although in 1942, French Somaliland was returned to the control of Free France, the Allied aligned government opposing Vichy France, which had allied with the Axis powers.

World War II impressed upon Somalis two lasting truths:

1. For the first time, they witnessed that the supposed invincibility of the European powers was only an illusion.
2. Through observation, debate, and their own efforts at self-education, they awakened to the ideal of political self-determination and to the imperative of building an independent Somali state.

This set the stage for growing political tensions in the region and laid the groundwork for the post-war nationalist movements and the later struggles over Somalia’s future under Italian administration.

The Road to Trusteeship

The specific tensions between SYL and Conferenze Somala directly stem from the Potzdam conference between July and August 1945. During this momentual conference, the victorious allied powers decided that the future of the former Italian colonies would be settled in an eventual peace treaty. This would be implemented in February 1947 with the signing of the Treaty of Paris between Italy and the Allied Powers. Under Article 23 of the treaty, Italy was to renounce all right and title to its former African Possessions: Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. Instead, it stipulated that their ultimate status will be determined jointly by the Four Powers (United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and later France) within one year from the treaty’s entry into force.

From the Somali perspective, the Somali Youth Club (SYC) was initially formed as early as May 1943, admist an environment in which the British Military Administration encouraged Somali political discourse with full knowledge of the brewing Somali nationalist sentiment against a return of Italy. For decades, the Italian fascist regime prevented Somalis from partaking in political life, forming organisations or education beyond the basic level. Following British capture of Somalia, London allowed Somalis to form political groups known as ‘clubs’ to allow political discourse. The British were interested in the strategic location of Somalia and wanted to retain its newly obtained possession following WWII. To do so, the British were adamant to curtail the growing Italian influence in Mogadishu and saw the momumentous rise of Somali nationalism as a possible beast to tame in an effort to usurp influence in the Horn. Such intentions were laid bare during the Paris Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers in April 1946. British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin proposed the unification of all Somali regions consisting of British and Italian Somalilands as well as the Western Somali region and the Reserved Area with a cavaet – indefinite British control as a colony. However, the British would soon realise that this growing Somali nationalist sentiment was not a beast that could be tamed and would eventually abandon its plans by 1948 following a compromise with the Italians cultivating in the Bevin-Sforza plan, although it too would fail to gain sufficient votes at the UN General Assembly in May 1949.

For the Italians, the retention of the colonies was paramount to Italian pride. However, following the Bevin-Sforza plan, Rome abandoned all claims apart from Italian Somaliland which it wished to govern as the “Administrative Authority” under the UN Trusteeship. One is probably wondering how Italy yielded such influence despite the catastrophic defeat in WWII. Indeed, it is a valid question as both Germany and Japan were dismantled top down and lost any independent self-govenance immediately after the war. Unlike the latter, Italy was already becoming a frontline in the newly emerging Cold War between the US-led Western bloc and Soviet-led Eastern bloc. Events in Germany made many Europeans nervouse of another frontline in Western Europe. This concern allowed Rome to gain support from Washington to return to Somalia due to its strategic location as well as to ensure a pro-western sentiment in Italy.

However, a major issue remained. How would the Italians convince local Somalis to allow its return following decades of oppression and colonialism? A handful of Italian former civil servants of the fascist regime remained in Somalia after the war and became the vanguard of Italian propaganda aimed at countering both Somali nationalism and British influence. Working through local Somali allies such as the Patriotic Beneficence Union (PBU), the Italians steadily built a network of sympathetic parties. By 1947 they had drawn together groups including the Somali Progressive Committee, Hizbiya Dighil and Mirifle, the Union of Africans in Somalia, and the Somali Young Agbal Association, among others, to create the Conferenza Somala. This coalition cast Italy as a necessary protector against what it portrayed as the “dominance of nomadic clans” represented by the SYL – a form of tribal politics that continues to plague Somali affairs today.

Conversely, the SYL rejected the return of Italy in any form. At the Four Powers Commission hearings in Mogadishu in January 1948, the league’s stance was unmistakable: when asked whether Italy should administer Somalia under a UN trusteeship, SYL president Haji Mohamed Hussein replied simply, “No, never.” The Conferenza Somala, by contrast, urged a far different course, proposing that Italy govern Somalia for thirty years until 1980. They argued that such an extended mandate was needed to “educate” the population and build an egalitarian system capable of overcoming tribal divisions. Somali nationalist movements opposed this proposal with equal clarity and determination.

Ultimately, the Trusteeship Council approved the ‘Trusteeship Agreement’ which was submitted to the UN General Assembly which included a 10-year period for Italian rule before independence to the dismay of Somali nationalists and glee of the Conferenza Somala. The General Assembly approved the proposal in December 1950.

The Assassination: Tuesday 26 May, 1953

Ustad Osman Mohamed Hussein was a member of the pro-Italian Hisbiya Dighil and Mirifle (HDM) party and a member of the Territorial Council – the predecessor of the Legislative Assembly created in 1956. The young Councillor was gunned down outside his home in the Hamar-weyne district of Mogadishu ahead of his planned trip to New York the following day. Rumours circulated that the main purpose of the HDM envoy led by Ustad Osman to the UN was to formulate a request to prolong the trusteeship mandate on Somalia by an additional 20-years although this could not be verified. In addition, the HDM party also argued for a federal system in Somalia along clan lines which was heavily opposed the SYL due to the trenchment of tribal politics. The irony, of course, is striking when viewed against Somalia’s present-day political framework, where clan-based federalism is a defining feature.

The HDM party leveled accusations against the SYL, but the SYL responded decisively, issuing a public statement condemning the murder. Many members of the Conferenza Somala, however, dismissed the condemnation. In June 1953, the UN Trusteeship Administrator, Enrico Martino, paid an emotional tribute to the slain councillor. To honour his memory, a street in Mogadishu was renamed from Via Vincenzo Gioberti to Via Ustad Osman.

What can we learn from this incident?

The murder of Ustad Osman Mohamed Hussein is more than a tragic footnote in Somali history, it is a warning that still resonates today. It reveals how deeply clan loyalties can shape politics, how foreign powers exploit these divisions for their own gain, and how violence has long been wielded to silence dissent. The Italian administration’s early boundaries and governance structures planted the seeds of a clan-based system that continues to haunt Somali federalism. The idea of Lower Shabelle, Lower Juba or Middle Jubba are prime examples of regions formed by Italy along clan distribution lines.

Today, Somalia faces a strikingly familiar predicament: a leadership accused of serving its own interests, and an opposition accused of doing the same. Both sides trade accusations of foreign influence, while the Somali people watch as old divisions rooted in clan loyalties and historical power struggles that continue to shape the nation’s destiny. The lesson of Ustad Osman’s era is clear: unless Somali leaders rise above narrow interests and put the country first, history will continue to repeat itself.